Public-Good Provision with Many Participants

DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00257MaRDI QIDQ4817921zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Martin Hellwig

Publication date 21 September 2004

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00257

zbMATH Keywords

individual rationalityisoelasticsecond-best allocations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Public goods (91B18)

Recommendations

• Provision of public goods in a large economy
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Cited in

(23)

• One-sided private provision of public goods with implicit Lindahl pricing
• On the efficient provision of public goods by means of biased lotteries: the two player case
• The overprovision anomaly of private public food supply
• Collective decision through an informed mediator
• Mechanism design and intentions
• Proportional individual rationality and the provision of a public good in a large economy
• All or nothing: state capacity and optimal public goods provision
• Efficient compromising
• Strength in numbers: robust mechanisms for public goods with many agents
• Public goods with congestion
• Does the public sector over-provide club goods? A general result
• Public good provision in legislatures: the dynamics of enlargements
• A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments
• Optimal provision of a public good with costly exclusion
• On incentive compatible, individually rational public good provision mechanisms
• An experimental investigation of excludable public goods
• Toward an efficiency rationale for the public provision of private goods
• Private provision of environmental public goods: household participation in green-electricity programs
• Pareto optimal provisions as outcomes of voluntary public good supply
• Inequality-averse principal, exogenous budget, and second-best public-goods provision
• Public goods, participation constraints, and democracy: a possibility theorem
• To sell public or private goods
• On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation for environments with nonlinear utilities

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