Public-Good Provision with Many Participants
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Cited in
(25)- Provision of public goods in a large economy
- Optimal provision of public goods with altruistic individuals
- An experimental investigation of excludable public goods
- Does the public sector over-provide club goods? A general result
- Public good provision in legislatures: the dynamics of enlargements
- On incentive compatible, individually rational public good provision mechanisms
- To sell public or private goods
- Toward an efficiency rationale for the public provision of private goods
- Optimal provision of a public good with costly exclusion
- All or nothing: state capacity and optimal public goods provision
- On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation for environments with nonlinear utilities
- On the efficient provision of public goods by means of biased lotteries: the two player case
- A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments
- Proportional individual rationality and the provision of a public good in a large economy
- Private provision of environmental public goods: household participation in green-electricity programs
- Public goods with congestion
- Mechanism design and intentions
- One-sided private provision of public goods with implicit Lindahl pricing
- Public goods, participation constraints, and democracy: a possibility theorem
- Inequality-averse principal, exogenous budget, and second-best public-goods provision
- Strength in numbers: robust mechanisms for public goods with many agents
- Collective decision through an informed mediator
- Pareto optimal provisions as outcomes of voluntary public good supply
- The overprovision anomaly of private public food supply
- Efficient compromising
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