A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2005.12.006zbMath1280.91068MaRDI QIDQ2370509

Thomas R. Palfrey, John O. Ledyard

Publication date: 26 June 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/79629/

zbMATH Keywords

public goods; mechanism design; incentive compatibility; private values; interim efficiency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B18: Public goods

91B32: Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.)

Related Items

Interim efficient auctions with interdependent valuations, Speculative partnership dissolution with auctions, Introduction to the special issue of Games and Economic Behavior in honor of John O. Ledyard, Fostering cooperation through the enhancement of own vulnerability, Interim third-party selection in bargaining, Efficient trading with nonlinear utility, Closure under interim utility equivalence implies two-agent Bayesian implementation, Optimal crowdfunding design, Auctioning a discrete public good under incomplete information

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