A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments
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Publication:2370509
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2005.12.006zbMath1280.91068OpenAlexW2056324440MaRDI QIDQ2370509
Thomas R. Palfrey, John O. Ledyard
Publication date: 26 June 2007
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/79629/
Public goods (91B18) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Related Items (11)
Closure under interim utility equivalence implies two-agent Bayesian implementation ⋮ Informed principal problems in bilateral trading ⋮ Interim efficient auctions with interdependent valuations ⋮ Optimal design for redistributions among endogenous buyers and sellers ⋮ Speculative partnership dissolution with auctions ⋮ Introduction to the special issue of Games and Economic Behavior in honor of John O. Ledyard ⋮ Fostering cooperation through the enhancement of own vulnerability ⋮ Interim third-party selection in bargaining ⋮ Efficient trading with nonlinear utility ⋮ Optimal crowdfunding design ⋮ Auctioning a discrete public good under incomplete information
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