Interim efficient auctions with interdependent valuations
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Publication:405757
DOI10.1007/s00712-011-0226-8zbMath1294.91065OpenAlexW2056985847MaRDI QIDQ405757
Publication date: 5 September 2014
Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-011-0226-8
Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Cites Work
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