Interim efficient auctions with interdependent valuations

DOI10.1007/S00712-011-0226-8zbMATH Open1294.91065OpenAlexW2056985847MaRDI QIDQ405757FDOQ405757

Authors: Serkan Kucuksenel 

Publication date: 5 September 2014

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-011-0226-8

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zbMATH Keywords

auctionsinterdependent valuesincentive efficiency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Noncooperative games (91A10)

Cites Work

• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
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• Optimal Auction Design
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• Partnerships and double auctions with interdependent valuations.
• Balanced Bayesian mechanisms
• A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments
• Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions
• Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus

Cited In (4)

• Asymptotic revenue equivalence of asymmetric auctions with interdependent values
• An experimental analysis of auctions with interdependent valuations
• Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
• When and why not to auction

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