An Efficient Auction

DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00322zbMath1121.91352OpenAlexW2039766717MaRDI QIDQ5474991

Philip J. Reny, Motty Perry

Publication date: 16 June 2006

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00322

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (31)

Approximation in mechanism design with interdependent values ⋮ Efficient allocations in economies with asymmetric information when the realized frequency of types is common knowledge ⋮ Optimal equity auction with interdependent valuations ⋮ Optimal combinatorial mechanism design ⋮ Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective ⋮ Auction Design for the Efficient Allocation of Service Capacity Under Congestion ⋮ Maskin meets Abreu and Matsushima ⋮ On existence of ex post Nash consistent representation for effectivity functions ⋮ The limits of ex post implementation without transfers ⋮ Interim efficient auctions with interdependent valuations ⋮ Efficient sequential screening with informational externalities ⋮ Efficient assignment with interdependent values ⋮ On efficiency of the English auction ⋮ Asymmetric English auctions. ⋮ Revenue and efficiency in multi-unit uniform-price auctions ⋮ Finite supermodular design with interdependent valuations ⋮ The robustness of robust implementation ⋮ Second best efficiency and the English auction ⋮ Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade. ⋮ Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions. ⋮ Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values ⋮ Implementation in an interdependent value framework ⋮ Ex post implementation ⋮ Spanning tree auctions: a complete characterization ⋮ Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials ⋮ The participatory Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism ⋮ Simple sequencing problems with interdependent costs ⋮ An experimental analysis of auctions with interdependent valuations ⋮ Merger negotiations and ex-post regret ⋮ Interdependent value auctions with insider information: theory and experiment ⋮ Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models

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