Simple sequencing problems with interdependent costs
From MaRDI portal
Publication:705856
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2003.09.005zbMath1117.90307MaRDI QIDQ705856
Manipushpak Mitra, Roland Hain
Publication date: 16 February 2005
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/78388
90B22: Queues and service in operations research
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