Achieving the first best in sequencing problems.

DOI10.1007/s100580200071zbMath1156.90385OpenAlexW2045053014MaRDI QIDQ1862642

Manipushpak Mitra

Publication date: 15 July 2003

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/78375

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Queues and service in operations research (90B22) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (20)

Subgroup additivity in the queueing problem ⋮ Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems ⋮ Cost sharing in a job scheduling problem ⋮ A rescheduling and cost allocation mechanism for delayed arrivals ⋮ Incentives and justice for sequencing problems ⋮ Second-best mechanisms in queuing problems without transfers: the role of random priorities ⋮ Recent developments in the queueing problem ⋮ Auctioning and selling positions: a non-cooperative approach to queueing conflicts ⋮ Weak group strategy-proof and queue-efficient mechanisms for the queueing problem with multiple machines ⋮ Balanced VCG mechanisms for sequencing problems ⋮ Balanced consistency and balanced cost reduction for sequencing problems ⋮ Strategy-proof and anonymous rule in queueing problems: a relationship between equity and efficiency ⋮ Proportional scheduling, split-proofness, and merge-proofness ⋮ Consistency and monotonicity in sequencing problems ⋮ When queueing is better than push and shove ⋮ Group strategyproofness in queueing models ⋮ Simple sequencing problems with interdependent costs ⋮ Balanced implementability of sequencing rules ⋮ No-envy in queueing problems ⋮ A pessimistic approach to the queueing problem

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