Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems
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Cites work
- A characterization of the Shapley value in queueing problems
- A note on the extension of an order on a set to the power set
- A pessimistic approach to the queueing problem
- Achieving the first best in sequencing problems.
- An alternative characterization of the uniform rule
- Efficient strategy-proof allocation functions in linear production economies
- Even-chance lotteries in social choice theory
- Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3646588 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 53195 (Why is no real title available?)
- Identical preferences lower bound solution and consistency in economies with indivisible goods
- Incentives in Teams
- Manipulation and the Pareto rule
- Manipulation of social choice functions
- Mechanism design in queueing problems
- Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules
- No-envy in queueing problems
- On the extension of preferences over a set to the power set: An axiomatic characterization of a quasi-ordering
- Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized
- Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions without Singlevaluedness
- The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
- The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms that Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance
Cited in
(33)- Second-best mechanisms in queuing problems without transfers: the role of random priorities
- Reordering an existing queue
- A characterization of the Shapley value in queueing problems
- Weak group strategy-proof and queue-efficient mechanisms for the queueing problem with multiple machines
- Prior-free online mechanisms for queueing with arrivals
- No-envy, solidarity, and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem
- Egalitarian equivalence and strategyproofness in the queueing problem
- A characterization of the symmetrically balanced VCG rule in the queueing problem
- No-envy and egalitarian-equivalence under multi-object-demand for heterogeneous objects
- Incentives and justice for sequencing problems
- Egalitarianism in the queueing problem
- Recent developments in the queueing problem
- No-envy in queueing problems
- A pessimistic approach to the queueing problem
- Subgroup additivity in the queueing problem
- Fair queueing
- Strategy-proof and anonymous rule in queueing problems: a relationship between equity and efficiency
- Characterizations of pivotal mechanisms in the queueing problem
- No-envy in the queueing problem with multiple identical machines
- Jumping the queue: an experiment on procedural preferences
- Welfare lower bounds and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem
- When queueing is better than push and shove
- Fair Queuing and Other Probabilistic Allocation Methods
- A characterization of the Vickrey rule in slot allocation problems
- Consistent queueing rules
- Balanced VCG mechanisms for sequencing problems
- Queueing games with an endogenous number of machines
- The on-line transfer rule for queueing with arrivals
- Generalized welfare lower bounds and strategyproofness in sequencing problems
- The Shapley value in positional queueing problems
- Axiomatic and strategic foundations for the pairwise equal splitting rule in sequencing problems with an initial queue
- Cost-symmetric transfer rules for queueing with arrivals
- Axiomatic and strategic justifications of the connected equal splitting rule in the reordering problem
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