Strategy-proof and anonymous rule in queueing problems: a relationship between equity and efficiency
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Cites work
- A characterization of the Shapley value in queueing problems
- A pessimistic approach to the queueing problem
- Achieving the first best in sequencing problems.
- Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems
- Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity
- Consistency and monotonicity in sequencing problems
- Cost sharing in a job scheduling problem
- Group strategyproofness in queueing models
- Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
- Incomplete information and multiple machine queueing problems
- Large Indivisibles: An Analysis with Respect to Price Equilibrium and Fairness
- Mechanism design in queueing problems
- No-envy in queueing problems
- Simple sequencing problems with interdependent costs
Cited in
(16)- Egalitarian equivalence and strategyproofness in the queueing problem
- A characterization of the symmetrically balanced VCG rule in the queueing problem
- Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity
- Characterization of \textit{maxmed} mechanisms for multiple objects
- Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems
- Characterizations of pivotal mechanisms in the queueing problem
- Corrigendum to ``Characterizations of Pareto-efficient, fair, and strategy-proof allocation rules in queueing problems
- Characterization of Vickrey auction with reserve price for multiple objects
- Weak group strategy-proof and queue-efficient mechanisms for the queueing problem with multiple machines
- No-envy and egalitarian-equivalence under multi-object-demand for heterogeneous objects
- No-envy in the queueing problem with multiple identical machines
- Queueing games with an endogenous number of machines
- Incentives and justice for sequencing problems
- Fair and group strategy-proof good allocation with money
- Recent developments in the queueing problem
- Welfare lower bounds and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem
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