Characterization of \textit{maxmed} mechanisms for multiple objects
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Publication:6587049
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Cites work
- A Solomonic solution to the problem of assigning a private indivisible good
- Algorithmic Game Theory
- Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects
- Auctioning or assigning an object: some remarkable VCG mechanisms
- Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods
- Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity
- Constrained-optimal strategy-proof assignment: beyond the Groves mechanisms
- Fair and group strategy-proof good allocation with money
- Incentives in Teams
- Incremental cost sharing: Characterization by coalition strategy-proofness
- Non-bossiness
- Optimal allocation of an indivisible good
- Optimal private good allocation: the case for a balanced budget
- Optimal-in-expectation redistribution mechanisms
- Strategy proofness and Pareto efficiency in quasilinear exchange economies
- Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
- Strategy-proof and anonymous rule in queueing problems: a relationship between equity and efficiency
- Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions
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