Constrained-optimal strategy-proof assignment: beyond the Groves mechanisms

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2012.09.015zbMath1285.91067MaRDI QIDQ2447059

Yves Sprumont

Publication date: 23 April 2014

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.cireqmontreal.com/wp-content/uploads/cahiers/14-2011-cah.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

assignment; Groves mechanisms; constrained optimality; strategy-proof mechanisms; no envy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B32: Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.)

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