Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods
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Publication:2505520
DOI10.1007/s00199-005-0014-1zbMath1113.91033MaRDI QIDQ2505520
Publication date: 26 September 2006
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0014-1
strategy-proof; Pareto dominance relation; envy-freeness; Groves mechanism; decision-efficiency; indivisble goods
91B06: Decision theory
91B18: Public goods
91B32: Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.)
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