Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods

DOI10.1007/s00199-005-0014-1zbMath1113.91033OpenAlexW2070888449MaRDI QIDQ2505520

Shinji Ohseto

Publication date: 26 September 2006

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0014-1

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofPareto dominance relationenvy-freenessGroves mechanismdecision-efficiencyindivisble goods

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Public goods (91B18) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (33)

No-envy and egalitarian-equivalence under multi-object-demand for heterogeneous objects ⋮ Incentive-compatible simple mechanisms ⋮ Envy-free and budget-balanced assignment of identical objects ⋮ Joint misrepresentation with bribes ⋮ Strategic manipulations of multi-valued solutions in economies with indivisibilities ⋮ Consistent house allocation ⋮ No-envy, solidarity, and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem ⋮ Maskin monotonicity in economies with indivisible goods and money ⋮ Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement ⋮ On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion ⋮ Egalitarian-equivalence and strategy-proofness in the object allocation problem with non-quasi-linear preferences ⋮ Explicitly simple near-tie auctions ⋮ An equity characterization of second price auctions when preferences may not be quasilinear ⋮ Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity ⋮ Fair waste pricing: an axiomatic analysis to the NIMBY problem ⋮ Second-best efficiency of allocation rules: strategy-proofness and single-peaked preferences with multiple commodities ⋮ Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices ⋮ Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets ⋮ Constrained-optimal strategy-proof assignment: beyond the Groves mechanisms ⋮ Vickrey allocation rule with income effect ⋮ Weakly fair allocations and strategy-proofness ⋮ Second price auctions on general preference domains: two characterizations ⋮ Strategy-proof and symmetric allocation of an indivisible good ⋮ Fair and group strategy-proof good allocation with money ⋮ Egalitarian equivalence and strategyproofness in the queueing problem ⋮ Welfare lower bounds and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem ⋮ The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation ⋮ Strategy-proofness versus symmetry in economies with an indivisible good and money ⋮ Auctioning or assigning an object: some remarkable VCG mechanisms ⋮ Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint ⋮ Strategy-proof and Pareto efficient allocation of indivisible goods: general impossibility domains ⋮ Coalitional strategy-proofness and fairness ⋮ Strategy-proof assignment with fair compensation

Cites Work

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