Games of fair division
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Publication:1893376
DOI10.1006/GAME.1995.1015zbMATH Open0835.90132OpenAlexW1978656451WikidataQ59972916 ScholiaQ59972916MaRDI QIDQ1893376FDOQ1893376
Authors: Koichi Tadenuma, William Thomson 
Publication date: 15 April 1996
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1995.1015
Recommendations
Social choice (91B14) Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Cited In (46)
- The costs and benefits of symmetry in common-ownership allocation problems
- Nash-implementation of the no-envy solution on symmetric domains of economies
- Partition games
- About inheritance distribution.
- Manipulation games in economies with indivisible goods
- Strategic manipulations of multi-valued solutions in economies with indivisibilities
- Are incentives against economic justice?
- Bidding for envy-freeness: a procedural approach to \(n\)-player fair-division problems
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Cooperation in dividing the cake
- Envy freeness in experimental fair division problems
- Nash implementation of competitive equilibria in the job-matching market
- Sincere and sophisticated players in an equal-income market
- Coalition formation in games of fair division
- Let them cheat!
- Equitable rent division on a soft budget
- Fair waste pricing: an axiomatic analysis to the NIMBY problem
- Joint misrepresentation with bribes
- Divide-and-permute
- Coalitional stability in the location problem with single-dipped preferences: an application of the minimax theorem
- An algorithm for identifying least manipulable envy‐free and budget‐balanced allocations in economies with indivisibilities
- Computation Problems for Envy Stable Solutions of Allocation Problems with Public Resources
- Refinements of the no-envy solution in economies with indivisible goods
- The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation
- Voting games of resolute social choice correspondences
- Fair division with no information
- Bargaining and bargaining sets.
- Strategy-proof and symmetric allocation of an indivisible good
- Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money
- Coalitional strategy-proofness and fairness
- Eliciting preferences to assign positions and compensation
- Double implementation in a market for indivisible goods with a price constraint
- Fairness and implementability in allocation of indivisible objects with monetary compensations
- Second price auctions on general preference domains: two characterizations
- Maskin monotonicity in economies with indivisible goods and money
- Fair divisions as attracting Nash equilibria of simple games
- No-envy and egalitarian-equivalence under multi-object-demand for heterogeneous objects
- A new approach to fair distribution of welfare
- A Solomonic solution to the problem of assigning a private indivisible good
- Least manipulable envy-free rules in economies with indivisibilities
- Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods
- Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint
- Generalized average rules as stable Nash mechanisms to implement generalized median rules
- Sharing an increase of the rent fairly
- Manipulation in the division problem for two players
- Divide and compromise
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