Envy freeness in experimental fair division problems
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(12)- Fair by design: multidimensional envy-free mechanisms
- Formal properties of interpersonal envy
- Resource-monotonicity and population-monotonicity in connected cake-cutting
- INEQUALITY AVERSION CAUSES EQUAL OR UNEQUAL DIVISION IN ALTERNATING‐OFFER BARGAINING
- Fair cake-cutting in practice
- Group Envy Freeness and Group Pareto Efficiency in Fair Division with Indivisible Items
- Monotonicity and competitive equilibrium in cake-cutting
- An axiomatic approach to the measurement of envy
- Envy-Free Division of Land
- Competing allocation principles: time for compromise?
- Envy, malice and Pareto efficiency: an experimental examination
- The costs and benefits of symmetry in common-ownership allocation problems
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