Group Envy Freeness and Group Pareto Efficiency in Fair Division with Indivisible Items

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-00111-7_6zbMath1518.91096MaRDI QIDQ6488080

Martin Aleksandrov, Toby Walsh

Publication date: 24 March 2023

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (3)

Almost envy-freeness for groups: improved bounds via discrepancy theory ⋮ Computing welfare-maximizing fair allocations of indivisible goods ⋮ Almost envy-freeness in group resource allocation

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