The costs and benefits of symmetry in common-ownership allocation problems

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.01.008MaRDI QIDQ263386zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Alexander L. Brown, Rodrigo A. Velez

Publication date 5 April 2016

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://pvsessions.tamu.edu/RePEc/brownsymmetry.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

experimental economicsbehavioral mechanism designdivide-and-chooseno-envywinner's-bid auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Experimental studies (91A90)

Recommendations

• Divide and compromise
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Cites work

• Amicable divorce: Dissolving a partnership with simple mechanisms
• Are incentives against economic justice?
• Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions: an experiment
• Auctions with anticipated emotions: overbidding, underbidding, and optimal reserve prices
• Collusive behavior in noncooperative epsilon-equilibria of oligopolies with long but finite lives
• Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
• Double implementation in a market for indivisible goods with a price constraint
• Envy freeness in experimental fair division problems
• Games of fair division
• How to divide the possession of a football?
• Large Indivisibles: An Analysis with Respect to Price Equilibrium and Fairness
• Manipulation games in economies with indivisible goods
• Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
• Refinements of the no-envy solution in economies with indivisible goods
• Regular quantal response equilibrium
• Room assignment-rent division: a market approach
• Sincere and sophisticated players in an equal-income market
• Stated Beliefs and Play in Normal-Form Games
• Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests

Cited in

(3)

• Divide and compromise
• Distributing the Benefits from the Commons: A Square-Root Formula
• Using clock auctions to dissolve partnership: an experimental study

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• Z-Tree
• ORSEE

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