The costs and benefits of symmetry in common-ownership allocation problems
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.01.008zbMATH Open1347.91153OpenAlexW2254637486MaRDI QIDQ263386FDOQ263386
Alexander L. Brown, Rodrigo A. Velez
Publication date: 5 April 2016
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://pvsessions.tamu.edu/RePEc/brownsymmetry.pdf
Recommendations
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Experimental studies (91A90)
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Cited In (2)
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