Refinements of the no-envy solution in economies with indivisible goods

DOI10.1007/BF01078984zbMath0845.90036WikidataQ59972907 ScholiaQ59972907MaRDI QIDQ1908006

William Thomson, Koichi Tadenuma

Publication date: 28 February 1996

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

selections; fair allocation; population-monotonicity; economies with indivisible goods; envy-free allocation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

91B32: Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.)

Related Items

To Envy or To Be Envied? Refinements of the Envy Test for the Compensation Problem, The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation, Equal shadow wealth: a new concept of fairness in exchange economies, Welfarism and rationalizability in allocation problems with indivisibilities, A characterization of the Shapley value in queueing problems, Eliciting preferences to assign positions and compensation, Least manipulable envy-free rules in economies with indivisibilities

Cites Work

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