Refinements of the no-envy solution in economies with indivisible goods
DOI10.1007/BF01078984zbMATH Open0845.90036OpenAlexW1999167610WikidataQ59972907 ScholiaQ59972907MaRDI QIDQ1908006FDOQ1908006
Koichi Tadenuma, William Thomson
Publication date: 28 February 1996
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01078984
fair allocationpopulation-monotonicityselectionseconomies with indivisible goodsenvy-free allocation
Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Cites Work
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Cited In (19)
- The costs and benefits of symmetry in common-ownership allocation problems
- To Envy or To Be Envied? Refinements of the Envy Test for the Compensation Problem
- Identical preferences lower bound solution and consistency in economies with indivisible goods
- An algorithm for identifying least manipulable envy‐free and budget‐balanced allocations in economies with indivisibilities
- Welfarism and rationalizability in allocation problems with indivisibilities
- The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation
- A characterization of the Shapley value in queueing problems
- An axiomatic approach to the measurement of envy
- Existence of efficient envy-free allocations of a heterogeneous divisible commodity with nonadditive utilities
- Eliciting preferences to assign positions and compensation
- Equal shadow wealth: a new concept of fairness in exchange economies
- A derivation of the money rawlsian solution
- No-envy and egalitarian-equivalence under multi-object-demand for heterogeneous objects
- Least manipulable envy-free rules in economies with indivisibilities
- Sharing an increase of the rent fairly
- Consistent queueing rules
- No-Envy and Consistency in Economies with Indivisible Goods
- On the Shapley-Scarf economy: The case of multiple types of indivisible goods
- Divide and compromise
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