The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation
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Cites work
- A Simple Expression for the Shapley Value in a Special Case
- A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems
- An Application of the Shapley Value to Fair Division with Money
- Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods
- Coalition formation in games of fair division
- Distortion of Utilities and the Bargaining Problem
- Eliciting preferences to assign positions and compensation
- Equilibrium allocations of Walrasian preference games
- Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice
- Fair division under joint ownership: Recent results and open problems
- Fairness and implementability in allocation of indivisible objects with monetary compensations
- Feasible and Continuous Implementation
- Games of fair division
- Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
- House allocation with transfers
- Identical preferences lower bound solution and consistency in economies with indivisible goods
- Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
- Implementing egalitarian-equivalent allocation of indivisible goods on restricted domains
- Incentives in Teams
- Large Indivisibles: An Analysis with Respect to Price Equilibrium and Fairness
- Limit properties of equilibrium allocations of Walrasian strategic games
- Manipulation games in economies with indivisible goods
- Maskin monotonicity in economies with indivisible goods and money
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Preference revelation games and strong cores of allocation problems with indivisibilities
- Refinements of the no-envy solution in economies with indivisible goods
- Secure implementation in economies with indivisible objects and money
- Stable matchings and rematching-proof equilibria in a two-sided matching market
- Strategic manipulations of multi-valued solutions in economies with indivisibilities
- Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with an indivisible good
- Strategy-proof and efficient allocation of an indivisible good on finitely restricted preference domains
- Strategy-proof and nonbossy allocation of indivisible goods and money
- Strategy-proof and symmetric allocation of an indivisible good
- The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
- The Manipulability of Resource Allocation Mechanisms
- The fair allocation of an indivisible good when monetary compensations are possible
- The manipulability of the Shapley-value
- Toward Natural Implementation
Cited in
(11)- Fair and group strategy-proof good allocation with money
- Strategic manipulations of multi-valued solutions in economies with indivisibilities
- Fair waste pricing: an axiomatic analysis to the NIMBY problem
- Reversal of asymmetries of allocation mechanisms under manipulation
- Preference manipulations lead to the uniform rule
- The Manipulability of Resource Allocation Mechanisms
- Coalitional stability in the location problem with single-dipped preferences: an application of the minimax theorem
- Strategy-proof and symmetric allocation of an indivisible good
- Least manipulable envy-free rules in economies with indivisibilities
- Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money
- Manipulation via endowments in auctions with multiple goods
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