The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation

DOI10.1007/S00182-009-0156-7zbMATH Open1211.91155OpenAlexW2166715289MaRDI QIDQ532676FDOQ532676

Authors: Yuji Fujinaka, Toyotaka Sakai 

Publication date: 5 May 2011

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0156-7

Recommendations

• Least manipulable envy-free rules in economies with indivisibilities
• Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money
• Manipulation games in economies with indivisible goods
• The Manipulability of Resource Allocation Mechanisms
• Budget balance, fairness, and minimal manipulability

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designstrategy-proofnessNash implementationconsequence of strategic manipulationexistence of \(\varepsilon\)-Nash equilibriumindivisible good

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cites Work

• A Simple Expression for the Shapley Value in a Special Case
• Games of fair division
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• Large Indivisibles: An Analysis with Respect to Price Equilibrium and Fairness
• Distortion of Utilities and the Bargaining Problem
• Manipulation games in economies with indivisible goods
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• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
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• An Application of the Shapley Value to Fair Division with Money
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• The manipulability of the Shapley-value
• Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods
• The Manipulability of Resource Allocation Mechanisms
• Strategy-proof and efficient allocation of an indivisible good on finitely restricted preference domains
• Maskin monotonicity in economies with indivisible goods and money
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• Implementing egalitarian-equivalent allocation of indivisible goods on restricted domains
• Coalition formation in games of fair division
• Equilibrium allocations of Walrasian preference games
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• Identical preferences lower bound solution and consistency in economies with indivisible goods
• Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with an indivisible good
• Strategy-proof and symmetric allocation of an indivisible good
• Strategic manipulations of multi-valued solutions in economies with indivisibilities
• Limit properties of equilibrium allocations of Walrasian strategic games

Cited In (11)

• Strategic manipulations of multi-valued solutions in economies with indivisibilities
• Fair waste pricing: an axiomatic analysis to the NIMBY problem
• Preference manipulations lead to the uniform rule
• Coalitional stability in the location problem with single-dipped preferences: an application of the minimax theorem
• Strategy-proof and symmetric allocation of an indivisible good
• Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money
• Reversal of asymmetries of allocation mechanisms under manipulation
• Least manipulable envy-free rules in economies with indivisibilities
• Manipulation via endowments in auctions with multiple goods
• Fair and group strategy-proof good allocation with money
• The Manipulability of Resource Allocation Mechanisms

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