The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation
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Publication:532676
DOI10.1007/s00182-009-0156-7zbMath1211.91155OpenAlexW2166715289MaRDI QIDQ532676
Publication date: 5 May 2011
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0156-7
strategy-proofnessmechanism designNash implementationconsequence of strategic manipulationexistence of \(\varepsilon\)-Nash equilibriumindivisible good
Applications of game theory (91A80) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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