Equilibrium allocations of Walrasian preference games
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Publication:1837096
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(82)90014-XzbMath0506.90012MaRDI QIDQ1837096
Joseph Sicilian, Yoshihiko Otani
Publication date: 1982
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Cites Work
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