Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
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Publication:3208381
DOI10.2307/2297046zbMath0417.90027OpenAlexW2053959597MaRDI QIDQ3208381
Publication date: 1979
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297046
general equilibriumgame theoretic modelNash equilibrium pointsLindahl allocationspublic good economyWalrasian allocationsprivate goods economybalanced outcome functionsincentive compatible allocation mechanismsnumeraire goodWalrasian market clearing price
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