Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
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Publication:3208381
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(83)- Market games and Walrasian equilibria
- Credible implementation
- On the existence of optimal truth-dominant mechanisms
- On the generic inefficiency of differentiable market games
- Completely feasible and continuous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence with a message space of minimal dimension
- Efficiency properties of strategic market games: An axiomatic approach
- Multilateral bargaining and Walrasian equilibrium
- Dynamic implementation in two-agent economies
- Information complexity, punishment, and stability in two Nash efficient Lindahl mechanisms
- Instability in the implementation of Walrasian allocations
- The repeated public goods game: a solution using tit-for-tat and the Lindahl point
- Out-of-equilibrium performance of three Lindahl mechanisms: experimental evidence
- A stable Nash mechanism implementing Lindahl allocations for quasi-linear environments
- Incentives and competitive allocations in exchange economies with incomplete markets
- A local independence condition for characterization of Walrasian allocations rule
- Coalition-proof equilibria in a voluntary participation game
- Nash-implementation of competitive equilibria via a bounded mechanism
- Walrasian bargaining.
- General equilibrium concepts under imperfect competition: A Cournotian approach
- Walrasian allocations without price-taking behavior
- Game forms for Nash implementation of general social choice correspondences
- Approximately competitive equilibria in large finite economies
- A Clarke tax tâtonnement that converges to the Lindahl allocation
- Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. II. Advanced concepts and results
- Implementation of Pareto efficient allocations
- Sharing the cost of a public good: an incentive-constrained axiomatic approach
- Implementation in economies with non-convex production technologies unknown to the designer
- Equilibrium allocations of Walrasian preference games
- Stable implementation of Lindahl allocations
- Divide-and-permute
- Allocation of resources in a divisionalized firm
- The manipulability of the Shapley-value
- Perfect competition in an oligopoly (including bilateral monopoly)
- Cost sharing: Efficiency and implementation
- Continuous implementation of constrained rational expectations equilibria
- A solution to the problem of consumption externalities.
- Implementation of Lindahl equilibrium: An integration of the static and dynamic approaches
- Enlarging the collective model of household behavior: a revealed preference analysis
- Optimal provision of public goods through Nash equilibria
- Bargaining and bargaining sets.
- Consistent collusion-proofness and correlation in exchange economies.
- Inefficiency of smooth market mechanisms
- A feasible Nash implementation of Walrasian equilibria in the two-agent economy
- The optimal design of a market
- From Nash to Walras via Shapley-Shubik.
- Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence: the boundary problem
- Second thoughts of social dilemma in mechanism design
- Are we there yet? Mechanism design beyond equilibrium
- Fundamental impossibility theorems on voluntary participation in the provision of non-excludable public goods
- Mechanism design for demand management in energy communities
- Natural implementation in public goods economies
- Implementing Lindahl allocations by a withholding mechanism
- Pareto-optimal Nash equilibria are competitive in a repeated economy
- On informational efficiency and incentive aspects of generalized ratio equilibria
- Comparison of the voluntary contribution and Pareto-efficient mechanisms under voluntary participation
- Markets, correlation, and regret-matching
- Efficiency and imperfect competition with incomplete markets.
- A note on allocations attainable through Nash equilibria
- Double implementation of linear cost share equilibrium allocations
- A simple auctioneerless mechanism with Walrasian properties
- Anonymous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence: possibility and impossibility results
- A full characterization of Nash implementation with strategy space reduction
- Strategy-proof risk sharing
- Nash implementation in production economies
- Household behavior and individual autonomy: an extended Lindahl mechanism
- Subgame-perfect implementation of bargaining solutions.
- A voluntary participation game with a non-excludable public good
- Non-excludable public good experiments
- Stability of the Groves and Ledyard mechanism
- Implementation in production economies with increasing returns
- Nash and dominant strategy implementation in economic environments
- Nash implementation of the Lindahl performance in economies with just two consumers: an impossibility result
- Smooth versus discontinuous mechanisms
- Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types
- Completely feasible and continuous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence with any number of goods
- Communication requirements and strategic mechanisms for market organization
- Implementation of marginal cost pricing equilibrium allocations with transfers in economies with increasing returns to scale
- Incentive mechanism design for production economies with both private and public ownerships
- Walrasian analysis via two-player games
- The evolution of monetary equilibrium
- A simple market-like allocation mechanism for public goods
- Generalized Groves-Ledyard mechanisms
- A group incentive compatible mechanism yielding core allocations
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