Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points

game theoretic model general equilibrium Nash equilibrium points Lindahl allocations public good economy Walrasian allocations private goods economy balanced outcome functions incentive compatible allocation mechanisms numeraire good Walrasian market clearing price

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Cited In (83)

Credible implementation
On the existence of optimal truth-dominant mechanisms
On the generic inefficiency of differentiable market games
Completely feasible and continuous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence with a message space of minimal dimension
Efficiency properties of strategic market games: An axiomatic approach
Dynamic implementation in two-agent economies
Information complexity, punishment, and stability in two Nash efficient Lindahl mechanisms
Instability in the implementation of Walrasian allocations
The repeated public goods game: a solution using tit-for-tat and the Lindahl point
Out-of-equilibrium performance of three Lindahl mechanisms: experimental evidence
A stable Nash mechanism implementing Lindahl allocations for quasi-linear environments
Nash-implementation of competitive equilibria via a bounded mechanism
Coalition-proof equilibria in a voluntary participation game
A local independence condition for characterization of Walrasian allocations rule
General equilibrium concepts under imperfect competition: A Cournotian approach
Game forms for Nash implementation of general social choice correspondences
Approximately competitive equilibria in large finite economies
Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. II. Advanced concepts and results
A Clarke tax tâtonnement that converges to the Lindahl allocation
Implementation of Pareto efficient allocations
Sharing the cost of a public good: an incentive-constrained axiomatic approach
Implementation in economies with non-convex production technologies unknown to the designer
Equilibrium allocations of Walrasian preference games
Stable implementation of Lindahl allocations
Divide-and-permute
Allocation of resources in a divisionalized firm
The manipulability of the Shapley-value
Perfect competition in an oligopoly (including bilateral monopoly)
Cost sharing: Efficiency and implementation
Continuous implementation of constrained rational expectations equilibria
A solution to the problem of consumption externalities.
Implementation of Lindahl equilibrium: An integration of the static and dynamic approaches
Enlarging the collective model of household behavior: a revealed preference analysis
Bargaining and bargaining sets.
The optimal design of a market
Inefficiency of smooth market mechanisms
A feasible Nash implementation of Walrasian equilibria in the two-agent economy
Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence: the boundary problem
From Nash to Walras via Shapley-Shubik.
Fundamental impossibility theorems on voluntary participation in the provision of non-excludable public goods
Natural implementation in public goods economies
Implementing Lindahl allocations by a withholding mechanism
Pareto-optimal Nash equilibria are competitive in a repeated economy
Efficiency and imperfect competition with incomplete markets.
Markets, correlation, and regret-matching
A note on allocations attainable through Nash equilibria
A simple auctioneerless mechanism with Walrasian properties
Strategy-proof risk sharing
A full characterization of Nash implementation with strategy space reduction
Nash implementation in production economies
Household behavior and individual autonomy: an extended Lindahl mechanism
Subgame-perfect implementation of bargaining solutions.
Non-excludable public good experiments
A voluntary participation game with a non-excludable public good
Stability of the Groves and Ledyard mechanism
Implementation in production economies with increasing returns
Nash and dominant strategy implementation in economic environments
Nash implementation of the Lindahl performance in economies with just two consumers: an impossibility result
Smooth versus discontinuous mechanisms
Completely feasible and continuous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence with any number of goods
Communication requirements and strategic mechanisms for market organization
Incentive mechanism design for production economies with both private and public ownerships
Walrasian analysis via two-player games
Market games and Walrasian equilibria
A group incentive compatible mechanism yielding core allocations
A simple market-like allocation mechanism for public goods
Generalized Groves-Ledyard mechanisms
Multilateral bargaining and Walrasian equilibrium
Incentives and competitive allocations in exchange economies with incomplete markets
Walrasian bargaining.
Walrasian allocations without price-taking behavior
Optimal provision of public goods through Nash equilibria
Consistent collusion-proofness and correlation in exchange economies.
Second thoughts of social dilemma in mechanism design
Are we there yet? Mechanism design beyond equilibrium
Mechanism design for demand management in energy communities
Comparison of the voluntary contribution and Pareto-efficient mechanisms under voluntary participation
On informational efficiency and incentive aspects of generalized ratio equilibria
Double implementation of linear cost share equilibrium allocations
Anonymous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence: possibility and impossibility results
Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types
Implementation of marginal cost pricing equilibrium allocations with transfers in economies with increasing returns to scale
The evolution of monetary equilibrium

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