Cost sharing: Efficiency and implementation
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Publication:1966230
DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(98)00068-8zbMath0943.91042OpenAlexW2032784577WikidataQ57944329 ScholiaQ57944329MaRDI QIDQ1966230
David Wettstein, Todd R. Kaplan
Publication date: 10 September 2000
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(98)00068-8
General equilibrium theory (91B50) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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Cites Work
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- Subgame Perfect Implementation
- Walrasian Analysis via Strategic Outcome Functions
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