Nash implementation in production economies
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Publication:1893788
DOI10.1007/BF01212326zbMath0835.90005OpenAlexW2007348705MaRDI QIDQ1893788
Publication date: 13 July 1995
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01212326
Related Items (12)
Triple implementation by sharing mechanisms in production economies with unequal labor skills ⋮ Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent ⋮ Mechanism design for a solution to the tragedy of commons ⋮ Cost sharing: Efficiency and implementation ⋮ Implementation in production economies with increasing returns ⋮ Implementation of marginal cost pricing equilibrium allocations with transfers in economies with increasing returns to scale ⋮ Implementation of Pareto efficient allocations ⋮ Feasible Bayesian implementation with state dependent feasible sets ⋮ Implementation in economies with non-convex production technologies unknown to the designer ⋮ Nash implementation in production economies with unequal skills: a characterization ⋮ Incentive mechanism design for production economies with both private and public ownerships ⋮ Consistent collusion-proofness and correlation in exchange economies.
Cites Work
- On allocations attainable through Nash equilibria
- Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence without continuous, convex, and ordered preferences
- Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
- Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
- A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations
- Walrasian Analysis via Strategic Outcome Functions
- Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
- Manipulation via Endowments
- Feasible and Continuous Implementation
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
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