Mechanism design for a solution to the tragedy of commons

DOI10.1007/S10058-007-0035-2MaRDI QIDQ926327zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Akira Yamada, Naoki Yoshihara

Publication date 27 May 2008

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-007-0035-2

zbMATH Keywords

labor sovereigntyproportional solutiontriple implementationunknown and possibly overstated labor skills

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Recommendations

• Nash-implementation of pareto correspondence in cooperative economies
• The tragedy of the commons?
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Cites work

• A characterization of natural and double implementation in production economies
• Double implementation in economies with production technologies unknown to the designer
• Existence and Nash implementation of efficient sharing rules for a commonly owned technology
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3215724 (Why is no real title available?)
• Incentive mechanism design for production economies with both private and public ownerships
• Nash implementation in production economies
• The proportional solution for economies with both private and public ownership
• Toward Natural Implementation
• Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms

Cited in

(7)

• The combination of two tragedies: commons and anticommons tragedies
• The problem of multiple commons: a market design approach
• Nash implementation in production economies with unequal skills: a characterization
• Preventing the tragedy of the commons through punishment of over-consumers and encouragement of under-consumers
• Nash-implementation of pareto correspondence in cooperative economies
• Distributed Computing - IWDC 2003
• Dynamic mechanism design for a global commons

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