Toward Natural Implementation
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Recommendations
- Characterizing natural implementability: The fair and Walrasian correspondences
- Natural implementation in public goods economies
- A characterization of natural and double implementation in production economies
- Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies
- Nash implementation in production economies
Cited in
(53)- The endowment game when \(n = 2\)
- Natural implementation in public goods economies
- The optimal design of a market
- Beyond Nash bargaining theory: The Nash set
- An implementation-theoretic approach to non-cooperative foundations
- Characterizations of the public and private ownership solutions
- Characterizing natural implementability: The fair and Walrasian correspondences
- Walrasian and constrained Walrasian correspondences and Nash implementation
- Double implementation by a simple game form in the commons problem
- Procedurally fair implementation under complete information
- Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies
- Subgame-perfect implementation of bargaining solutions.
- Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms: Applications.
- Nash implementation via mechanisms that allow for abstentions
- A simple and procedurally fair game form for Nash implementation of the No-envy solution
- Self-implementation of social choice correspondences in Nash equilibrium
- Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization
- Implementation of marginal cost pricing equilibrium allocations with transfers in economies with increasing returns to scale
- Do coalitions matter in designing institutions?
- Nash implementation in production economies with unequal skills: a characterization
- Choosing the winner of a competition using natural mechanisms: conditions based on the jury
- Triple implementation by sharing mechanisms in production economies with unequal labor skills
- Divide-and-permute
- A characterization of natural and double implementation in production economies
- Implementation in partial equilibrium
- The minimum approval mechanism implements the efficient public good allocation theoretically and experimentally
- Anonymous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence: possibility and impossibility results
- Fairness and implementability in allocation of indivisible objects with monetary compensations
- Double implementation in a market for indivisible goods with a price constraint
- Implementation in production economies with increasing returns
- Nash implementation with an infinite-dimensional trade space
- Menu mechanisms
- Coalitional stability in the location problem with single-dipped preferences: an application of the minimax theorem
- A full characterization of Nash implementation with strategy space reduction
- Implementability and equity in production economies with unequal skills
- Ambiguous implementation: the partition model
- Implementation theory
- The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation
- Nash implementation of competitive equilibria in the job-matching market
- Implementation with unknown endowments in a two-trader pure exchange economy
- Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms
- Equitable rent division on a soft budget
- Binary mechanism for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences
- Are incentives against economic justice?
- Implementation via mechanisms with transfers
- Preference manipulations lead to the uniform rule
- Fighting collusion: an implementation theory approach
- Two-player rationalizable implementation
- Nash-implementation of the no-envy solution on symmetric domains of economies
- Credible implementation
- Mechanism design for a solution to the tragedy of commons
- Dominant strategy implementation in economic environments
- Implementation of Pareto efficient allocations
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