Choosing the winner of a competition using natural mechanisms: conditions based on the jury

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2019.02.001MaRDI QIDQ2329697zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Pablo Amorós

Publication date 18 October 2019

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.02.001

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumpartial jurywinner of competition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

• A natural mechanism for eliciting rankings when jurors have favorites
• A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants
• Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors
• Eliciting the socially optimal allocation from responsible agents
• Exclusion of self evaluations in peer ratings: an impossibility and some proposals
• Impartial nominations for a prize
• Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
• Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
• Picking the winners
• Role of honesty in full implementation
• Subgame perfect implementation of the deserving winner of a competition with natural mechanisms
• The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules
• The scholarship assignment problem
• Toward Natural Implementation

Cited in

(6)

• A natural mechanism for eliciting rankings when jurors have favorites
• Using sub-majoritarian rules to select the winner of a competition
• Picking the winners
• A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants
• Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors
• Selecting winners with partially honest jurors

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