Subgame perfect implementation of the deserving winner of a competition with natural mechanisms

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.06.006zbMath1397.91183OpenAlexW2262978656MaRDI QIDQ325031

Pablo Amorós

Publication date: 17 October 2016

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://theeconomics.uma.es/malagawpseries/Papers/METCwp2015-4.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

competitiondeserving winnerextensive form mechanismsnatural mechanismssocial optimum

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games in extensive form (91A18) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (4)

Eliciting the socially optimal allocation from responsible agents ⋮ Implementing optimal scholarship assignments via backward induction ⋮ Implementation Theory ⋮ Choosing the winner of a competition using natural mechanisms: conditions based on the jury

Cites Work

• Picking the winners
• A natural mechanism for eliciting rankings when jurors have favorites
• A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants
• Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
• The scholarship assignment problem
• Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
• Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors
• Implementing efficient, anonymous and neutral social choice functions
• Implementation via backward induction
• Role of honesty in full implementation
• Exclusion of self evaluations in peer ratings: an impossibility and some proposals
• Subgame Perfect Implementation
• Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
• Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules
• Implementation with evidence

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