Implementation via backward induction

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(92)90069-TzbMath0764.90012MaRDI QIDQ1183696

Maria José Herrero, Sanjay Srivastava

Publication date: 28 June 1992

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(92)90069-t

zbMATH Keywords

implementation; backward induction; condorcet cycle set; finite games of perfect information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A80: Applications of game theory

91B14: Social choice

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