A Procedure for Generating Pareto-Efficient Egalitarian-Equivalent Allocations
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Publication:4182191
DOI10.2307/1912345zbMATH Open0398.90007OpenAlexW2052815082MaRDI QIDQ4182191FDOQ4182191
Authors: Vincent P. Crawford 
Publication date: 1979
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1912345
Preference AnalysisSocial WelfareOperational ProcedurePareto-Efficient Egalitarian-Equivalent Allocations
Cited In (20)
- Non-cooperative implementation: A survey of recent results
- Fair division under joint ownership: Recent results and open problems
- Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value
- Implementing a public project and distributing its cost
- Sharing the cost of a public good: an incentive-constrained axiomatic approach
- Dissolving a partnership securely
- Gabrielle Demange
- Divide-and-permute
- Monotonicity and equal-opportunity equivalence in bargaining
- Dissolving a partnership dynamically
- Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
- Implementing the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution
- Recognition for sale
- Implementation via backward induction
- Social preferences for the evaluation of procedures
- Equity in exchange economies
- Efficient egalitarian equivalent allocations over a single good
- An efficient and egalitarian negotiation procedure for economies with externalities
- Welfare bounds in the fair division problem
- Divide and compromise
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