A Procedure for Generating Pareto-Efficient Egalitarian-Equivalent Allocations
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Publication:4182191
DOI10.2307/1912345zbMath0398.90007OpenAlexW2052815082MaRDI QIDQ4182191
Publication date: 1979
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1912345
Preference AnalysisSocial WelfareOperational ProcedurePareto-Efficient Egalitarian-Equivalent Allocations
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