A Procedure for Generating Pareto-Efficient Egalitarian-Equivalent Allocations

DOI10.2307/1912345MaRDI QIDQ4182191zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Vincent P. Crawford

Publication date 1979

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/1912345

zbMATH Keywords

Preference AnalysisSocial WelfareOperational ProcedurePareto-Efficient Egalitarian-Equivalent Allocations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

Cited in

(20)

• Non-cooperative implementation: A survey of recent results
• Fair division under joint ownership: Recent results and open problems
• Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value
• Implementing a public project and distributing its cost
• Sharing the cost of a public good: an incentive-constrained axiomatic approach
• Dissolving a partnership securely
• Gabrielle Demange
• Divide-and-permute
• Monotonicity and equal-opportunity equivalence in bargaining
• Dissolving a partnership dynamically
• Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
• Implementing the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution
• Implementation via backward induction
• Recognition for sale
• Social preferences for the evaluation of procedures
• Equity in exchange economies
• Efficient egalitarian equivalent allocations over a single good
• An efficient and egalitarian negotiation procedure for economies with externalities
• Welfare bounds in the fair division problem
• Divide and compromise

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