Implementing a public project and distributing its cost

DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(05)80044-4zbMath0763.90031WikidataQ56609434 ScholiaQ56609434MaRDI QIDQ1196663

S. Singh

Publication date: 16 January 1993

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

public goods; mechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A80: Applications of game theory

91B18: Public goods

Cites Work

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