Voluntary cost sharing for an excludable public project
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3650233 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3887382 (Why is no real title available?)
- Auction-like mechanisms for pricing excludable public goods
- Efficient Provision of a Discrete Public Good
- Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
- Incentives in Teams
- Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods
- The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
Cited in
(16)- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 910754 (Why is no real title available?)
- Implementing a public project and distributing its cost
- Efficiency and exclusion in collective action allocations
- Auction-like mechanisms for pricing excludable public goods
- The conservative equal costs rule, the serial cost sharing rule and the pivotal mechanism: asymptotic welfare loss comparisons for the case of an excludable public project
- Group strategyproof cost sharing: the role of indifferences
- Coalition strategy-proof mechanisms for provision of excludable public goods.
- Is Shapley cost sharing optimal?
- Characterizations of strategy-proof mechanisms for excludable versus nonexcludable public projects
- On cost sharing in the provision of a binary and excludable public good
- On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion
- An experimental evaluation of the serial cost sharing rule
- Serial cost sharing of an excludable public good available in multiple units
- Is Shapley Cost Sharing Optimal?
- Strategy-proof rules for an excludable public good
- Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods
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