Characterizations of strategy-proof mechanisms for excludable versus nonexcludable public projects
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Publication:1581906
DOI10.1006/game.1999.0755zbMath1032.91033MaRDI QIDQ1581906
Publication date: 11 March 2004
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0755
Related Items
The conservative equal costs rule, the serial cost sharing rule and the pivotal mechanism: asymptotic welfare loss comparisons for the case of an excludable public project, Coalition strategy-proof mechanisms for provision of excludable public goods., Serial cost sharing of an excludable public good available in multiple units
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