Characterizations of strategy-proof mechanisms for excludable versus nonexcludable public projects
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Publication:1581906
Recommendations
- Strategy-proof mechanisms of public good economies
- Coalition strategy-proof mechanisms for provision of excludable public goods.
- Strategy-proof rules for an excludable public good
- Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods
- Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for pure public goods economies when preferences are monotonic
- Strategy-proof probabilistic mechanisms in economies with pure public goods.
- Strategy-proof allocation of multiple public goods
- A characterization of strategy-proof social choice functions for economies with pure public goods
- Differentiable strategy-proof mechanisms for private and public goods in domains that are not necessarily large or quasi-linear
- Efficient Mechanisms for Public Goods with Use Exclusions
Cites work
- Auction-like mechanisms for pricing excludable public goods
- Incentive compatibility and individual rationality in public good economies
- Individual Rationality and Nash's Solution to the Bargaining Problem
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Problems of fair division and the egalitarian solution
- Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods
- Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
- Strategy-Proof Exchange
- Strategy-proof and Symmetric Social Choice Functions for Public Good Economies
- Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- The Fair Division of a Fixed Supply Among a Growing Population
- Voluntary cost sharing for an excludable public project
Cited in
(10)- Evolution in mechanisms for public projects
- On cost sharing in the provision of a binary and excludable public good
- Cost-sharing mechanism for excludable goods with generalized non-rivalry
- Serial cost sharing of an excludable public good available in multiple units
- The conservative equal costs rule, the serial cost sharing rule and the pivotal mechanism: asymptotic welfare loss comparisons for the case of an excludable public project
- The strategy-proof provision of public goods under congestion and crowding preferences
- On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion
- Coalition strategy-proof mechanisms for provision of excludable public goods.
- Utilitarian mechanism design for an excludable public good
- Strategy-proof rules for an excludable public good
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