Characterizations of strategy-proof mechanisms for excludable versus nonexcludable public projects
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Publication:1581906
DOI10.1006/GAME.1999.0755zbMATH Open1032.91033OpenAlexW2043684662MaRDI QIDQ1581906FDOQ1581906
Authors: Shinji Ohseto 
Publication date: 11 March 2004
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0755
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- Efficient Mechanisms for Public Goods with Use Exclusions
Cites Work
- Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods
- Individual Rationality and Nash's Solution to the Bargaining Problem
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Strategy-Proof Exchange
- Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies
- The Fair Division of a Fixed Supply Among a Growing Population
- Problems of fair division and the egalitarian solution
- Strategy-proof and Symmetric Social Choice Functions for Public Good Economies
- Auction-like mechanisms for pricing excludable public goods
- Voluntary cost sharing for an excludable public project
- Incentive compatibility and individual rationality in public good economies
Cited In (10)
- Evolution in mechanisms for public projects
- Utilitarian mechanism design for an excludable public good
- The conservative equal costs rule, the serial cost sharing rule and the pivotal mechanism: asymptotic welfare loss comparisons for the case of an excludable public project
- The strategy-proof provision of public goods under congestion and crowding preferences
- Coalition strategy-proof mechanisms for provision of excludable public goods.
- Cost-sharing mechanism for excludable goods with generalized non-rivalry
- On Groves mechanisms for costly inclusion
- On cost sharing in the provision of a binary and excludable public good
- Serial cost sharing of an excludable public good available in multiple units
- Strategy-proof rules for an excludable public good
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