Utilitarian mechanism design for an excludable public good
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Publication:992055
DOI10.1007/S00199-009-0488-3zbMATH Open1195.91045OpenAlexW1966802454MaRDI QIDQ992055FDOQ992055
Authors: Martin Hellwig 
Publication date: 8 September 2010
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-009-0488-3
Recommendations
- Optimal mechanism design for the private supply of a public good
- Efficient Mechanisms for Public Goods with Use Exclusions
- Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods
- Characterizations of strategy-proof mechanisms for excludable versus nonexcludable public projects
- Strategy-proof rules for an excludable public good
utilitarian welfare maximizationadmission rules for excludable public goodsrandomization in optimal mechanisms
Cites Work
- Game theory
- Optimization and nonsmooth analysis
- Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist
- Efficient Mechanisms for Public Goods with Use Exclusions
- Sufficient Conditions for the Optimal Control of Nonlinear Systems
- The law of large numbers with a continuum of i.i.d. random variables
- The exact law of large numbers via Fubini extension and characterization of insurable risks
- An expository note on individual risk without aggregate uncertainty
- Individual risk and Lebesgue extension without aggregate uncertainty
- An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
- On existence of rich Fubini extensions
- Weak measurability and characterizations of risk
- Utilitarian mechanism design for an excludable public good
Cited In (8)
- Efficient Mechanisms for Public Goods with Use Exclusions
- Modeling large societies: why countable additivity is necessary
- Optimal mechanism design for the private supply of a public good
- Utilitarian mechanism design for an excludable public good
- Simple subscription mechanisms for excludable public goods
- Welfare asymptotics of the pivotal mechanism for excludable public goods.
- Welfare maximization entices participation
- Excludable public goods: pricing and social welfare maximization
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