Utilitarian mechanism design for an excludable public good

DOI10.1007/s00199-009-0488-3zbMath1195.91045MaRDI QIDQ992055

Martin F. Hellwig

Publication date: 8 September 2010

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-009-0488-3

zbMATH Keywords

utilitarian welfare maximization; admission rules for excludable public goods; randomization in optimal mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B18: Public goods

91B15: Welfare economics

Related Items

Utilitarian mechanism design for an excludable public good, Modeling large societies: why countable additivity is necessary

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