Utilitarian mechanism design for an excludable public good

DOI10.1007/S00199-009-0488-3MaRDI QIDQ992055zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Martin Hellwig

Publication date 8 September 2010

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 2.0 Generic

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-009-0488-3

zbMATH Keywords

utilitarian welfare maximizationadmission rules for excludable public goodsrandomization in optimal mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Welfare economics (91B15) Public goods (91B18)

Recommendations

• Optimal mechanism design for the private supply of a public good
• Efficient Mechanisms for Public Goods with Use Exclusions
• Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods
• Characterizations of strategy-proof mechanisms for excludable versus nonexcludable public projects
• Strategy-proof rules for an excludable public good

Cites work

• An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
• An expository note on individual risk without aggregate uncertainty
• Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist
• Efficient Mechanisms for Public Goods with Use Exclusions
• Game theory
• Individual risk and Lebesgue extension without aggregate uncertainty
• On existence of rich Fubini extensions
• Optimization and nonsmooth analysis
• Sufficient Conditions for the Optimal Control of Nonlinear Systems
• The exact law of large numbers via Fubini extension and characterization of insurable risks
• The law of large numbers with a continuum of i.i.d. random variables
• Utilitarian mechanism design for an excludable public good
• Weak measurability and characterizations of risk

Cited in

(8)

• Efficient Mechanisms for Public Goods with Use Exclusions
• Modeling large societies: why countable additivity is necessary
• Optimal mechanism design for the private supply of a public good
• Utilitarian mechanism design for an excludable public good
• Simple subscription mechanisms for excludable public goods
• Welfare asymptotics of the pivotal mechanism for excludable public goods.
• Welfare maximization entices participation
• Excludable public goods: pricing and social welfare maximization

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