Optimal mechanism design for the private supply of a public good

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.03.014zbMath1281.91073MaRDI QIDQ2435905

Rudolf Müller, Gergely Csapó

Publication date: 21 February 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/879233/guid-44c5f27c-84f7-4963-8f34-d01afee05ce2-ASSET1.0.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

public good provision; mechanism design; profit maximization

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

90C05: Linear programming

90B05: Inventory, storage, reservoirs

91B18: Public goods

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

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