Allocative and informational externalities in auctions and related mechanisms
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Publication:3594544
zbMATH Open1303.91084MaRDI QIDQ3594544FDOQ3594544
Authors: Philippe Jehiel, Benny Moldovanu 
Publication date: 8 August 2007
Recommendations
- Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities
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- Optimal allocation mechanisms with type-dependent negative externalities
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Cited In (27)
- Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments
- Dynamic legislative decision making when interest groups control the agenda
- Efficient sequential screening with informational externalities
- The scope of auctions in the presence of downstream interactions and information externalities
- Informational Size and Efficient Auctions
- Auctions with flexible entry fees: a note
- Mechanism design and intentions
- An externality-robust auction: theory and experimental evidence
- On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts
- Optimal mechanism design for the private supply of a public good
- First-Price Auctions With General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue
- Efficient assignment with interdependent values
- Extremism drives out moderation
- Information disclosure in auctions with downstream competition
- Efficient incentives with social preferences
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Information, stochastic dominance and bidding: the case of treasury auctions
- The all-pay auction with complete information and identity-dependent externalities
- Post-auction investment by financially constrained bidders
- Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains
- Implementation of assortative matching under incomplete information
- Subsidy and taxation in all-pay auctions under incomplete information
- The Conditional Auction Mechanism for Sharing a Surplus
- Merger negotiations and ex-post regret
- Optimal allocation mechanisms with type-dependent negative externalities
- Towards data auctions with externalities
- On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation for environments with nonlinear utilities
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