An externality-robust auction: theory and experimental evidence
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4207454 (Why is no real title available?)
- A First Course in Order Statistics
- A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
- A note on budget balance under interim participation constraints: The case of independent types
- A theory of sequential reciprocity
- All equilibria of the Vickrey auction.
- Allocative and informational externalities in auctions and related mechanisms
- Ambiguous beliefs and mechanism design
- Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions: an experiment
- Auction design with a risk averse seller
- Auctions with anticipated emotions: overbidding, underbidding, and optimal reserve prices
- Auctions with cross-shareholdings
- Auctions with financial externalities
- Auctions with price-proportional benefits to bidders
- Cross-owned firms competing in auctions
- Efficiency in auctions with crossholdings
- Experimental comparison of multi-stage and one-stage contests
- Fault Tolerant Implementation
- Home-grown values and incentive compatible auction design
- Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms
- Impulse balance equilibrium and feedback in first price auctions
- Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?
- Mechanism design and intentions
- Microeconomic theory
- Motives and implementation: On the design of mechanisms to elicit opinions
- Multi-dimensional reference-dependent preferences in sealed-bid auctions -- how (most) laboratory experiments differ from the field
- Near-optimality of second price mechanisms in a class of asymmetric auctions
- Notes and Comments the Amsterdam Auction
- Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
- Optimal auctions with asymmetric financial externalities
- Other-regarding preferences in general equilibrium
- Personality in dictator and ultimatum games
- Quantal response equilibrium and overbidding in private-value auctions
- Rationalizable bidding in first-price auctions.
- Robust Mechanism Design
- Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes
- Spite and reciprocity in auctions
- Tit for tat: foundations of preferences for reciprocity in strategic settings
Cited in
(14)- Mechanism design and intentions
- Ex-post implementation with social preferences
- Adversarial behavior in network games
- Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities
- Efficient mechanisms for level-\(k\) bilateral trading
- Why are open ascending auctions popular? The role of information aggregation and behavioral biases
- Goodwill can hurt: a theoretical and experimental investigation of return policies in auctions
- Implementing the efficient auction: initial results from the lab
- Robust optimization strategies for seller based on uncertainty sets in context of sequential auction
- Optimal selling mechanisms with crossholdings
- The spite motive in third price auctions
- Behavioral mechanism design: evidence from the modified first-price auctions
- Explaining deviations from equilibrium in auctions with avoidable fixed costs
- Spite vs. risk: explaining overbidding in the second-price all-pay auction. A theoretical and experimental investigation
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