An externality-robust auction: theory and experimental evidence
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Publication:290178
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.04.004zbMATH Open1347.91149OpenAlexW3121865980MaRDI QIDQ290178FDOQ290178
Authors: Björn Bartling, Nick Netzer 
Publication date: 1 June 2016
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/126315/2/Externity%20robust%20App.%201.pdf
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- Title not available (Why is that?)
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Cited In (14)
- Mechanism design and intentions
- Ex-post implementation with social preferences
- Adversarial behavior in network games
- Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities
- Efficient mechanisms for level-\(k\) bilateral trading
- Why are open ascending auctions popular? The role of information aggregation and behavioral biases
- Goodwill can hurt: a theoretical and experimental investigation of return policies in auctions
- Implementing the efficient auction: initial results from the lab
- Robust optimization strategies for seller based on uncertainty sets in context of sequential auction
- Optimal selling mechanisms with crossholdings
- The spite motive in third price auctions
- Behavioral mechanism design: evidence from the modified first-price auctions
- Spite vs. risk: explaining overbidding in the second-price all-pay auction. A theoretical and experimental investigation
- Explaining deviations from equilibrium in auctions with avoidable fixed costs
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