Ex-post implementation with social preferences

DOI10.1007/S00355-020-01291-XMaRDI QIDQ2235086zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Boaz Zik

Publication date 20 October 2021

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-020-01291-x

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designsocial preferencespayoff-information-robustnesssocial-preference-robustness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• An externality-robust auction: theory and experimental evidence
• Mechanism design and intentions
• On the optimality of optimal income taxation
• Other-regarding preferences in general equilibrium
• Robust Mechanism Design
• The Limits of ex post Implementation

Cited in

(3)

• The Limits of ex post Implementation
• The limits of ex post implementation without transfers
• Efficient incentives with social preferences

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