The limits of ex post implementation without transfers

DOI10.3982/TE4915MaRDI QIDQ6076897OpenAlexFDO

Authors Tangren Feng, Qinggong Wu

Publication date 17 October 2023

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/te4915

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designinterdependent valuesnontransferable utilitycollective decision-makinginformational robustnessex post implementation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Social choice (91B14) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

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Cites work

• An Efficient Auction
• Domains admitting ex post incentive compatible and respectful mechanisms: a characterization for the two-alternative case
• Efficient Auctions
• Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
• Efficient assignment with interdependent values
• Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values
• Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
• Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models
• Robust Mechanism Design
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• The Limits of ex post Implementation
• The marriage problem with interdependent preferences

Cited in

(1)

• Voting with interdependent values: the Condorcet winner

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