A sufficient condition for two-person ex post implementation in a general environment

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2014.02.002MaRDI QIDQ2453829zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yoshihiro Ohashi

Publication date 11 June 2014

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2014.02.002

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• Two-person ex post implementation
• Ex post implementation
• A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
• The Limits of ex post Implementation
• Implementation without expected utility: ex-post verifiability

Cites work

• A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
• Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
• Ex post implementation
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
• Reconsidering two-agent Nash implementation
• Two-person ex post implementation

Cited in

(7)

• Posterior implementation vs ex-post implementation
• Partial ex-post verifiability and unique implementation of social choice functions
• Implementation without expected utility: ex-post verifiability
• Posterior Implementability in a Two-Person Decision Problem
• Two-person ex post implementation
• The limits of ex post implementation without transfers
• Ex post implementation

This page was built for publication: A sufficient condition for two-person ex post implementation in a general environment

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2453829)