Two-person ex post implementation

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.09.006MaRDI QIDQ417720zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yoshihiro Ohashi

Publication date 14 May 2012

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.09.006

zbMATH Keywords

ex post equilibriumimplementationtwo-person game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• A sufficient condition for two-person ex post implementation in a general environment
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Cites work

• Ex post implementation
• Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms
• Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization

Cited in

(7)

• Posterior implementation vs ex-post implementation
• A solution to the two-person implementation problem
• A sufficient condition for two-person ex post implementation in a general environment
• Posterior Implementability in a Two-Person Decision Problem
• The Limits of ex post Implementation
• The limits of ex post implementation without transfers
• Ex post implementation

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