Ex post implementation

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2006.10.006MaRDI QIDQ932807zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors B. E. Eshmatov

Publication date 11 July 2008

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.10.006

zbMATH Keywords

ex post equilibriumimplementationinterdependent valuessingle crossing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

• An Efficient Auction
• Bayesian Implementation
• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• Efficient Auctions
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4207454 (Why is no real title available?)
• Implementation in differential information economies
• Implementation in principal-agent models of adverse selection
• Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies
• Inefficient ex-post equilibria in efficient auctions
• Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
• Large Robust Games
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Nash implementation without no-veto power
• Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
• Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade.
• Robust Mechanism Design
• Secure implementation experiments: Do strategy-proof mechanisms really work?
• Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
• The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: new fraud in internet auctions.
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
• The Limits of ex post Implementation
• The relevance of private information in mechanism design

Cited in

(25)

• Ex post Nash equilibrium in linear Bayesian games for decision making in multi-environments
• Designing mechanisms to focalize welfare-improving strategies
• Posterior implementation vs ex-post implementation
• Nash implementation via mechanisms that allow for abstentions
• Implementation without expected utility: ex-post verifiability
• Incentives and justice for sequencing problems
• Implementation in an interdependent value framework
• A sufficient condition for two-person ex post implementation in a general environment
• Implementation with a sympathizer
• The Limits of ex post Implementation
• Two-person ex post implementation
• Algorithms and mechanisms for procuring services with uncertain durations using redundancy
• Implementation with evidence
• Incentive compatible market design with applications
• The limits of ex post implementation without transfers
• Behavioral implementation under incomplete information
• Double implementation in dominant strategy equilibria and ex-post equilibria with private values
• An alternative equivalent formulation for robust implementation
• Information acquisition and full surplus extraction
• Ex-post implementation with interdependent values
• Robust implementation in general mechanisms
• Auctioning control and cash-flow rights separately
• On existence of ex post Nash consistent representation for effectivity functions
• An undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values
• Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials

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