Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies
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- Publication:3476541
Cited in
(54)- Credible implementation
- Unimprovable allocations in economies with incomplete information
- Feasible mechanisms in economies with type-dependent endowments
- Incentive compatibility under ambiguity
- Contingent commodities and implementation
- Implementation theory
- Treading a fine line: (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals
- Nash-implementation of competitive equilibria via a bounded mechanism
- Extensive form implementation in incomplete information environments
- Informational smallness in rational expectations equilibria.
- Coalition-proof full efficient implementation
- Implementation without incentive compatibility: two stories with partially informed planners
- Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization
- Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms
- Ex post implementation
- The revelation approach to Nash implementation
- Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms
- Switching from complete to incomplete information
- Allocation of resources in a divisionalized firm
- Quantum Bayesian implementation
- Interactive implementation
- Full implementation of social choice functions in dominant strategies
- Continuous implementation of constrained rational expectations equilibria
- Rationalizable implementation
- Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals
- On the implementation of the median
- Dominant strategy implementation in economic environments
- Stopping agents from ``cheating
- Implementation of Walrasian expectations equilibria
- Implementation in economic environments with incomplete information: The use of multi-stage games
- Implementation in principal-agent models of adverse selection
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4145617 (Why is no real title available?)
- Continuous implementation in economies with incomplete information
- Sequential rationality, implementation and pre-play communication
- Closure under interim utility equivalence implies two-agent Bayesian implementation
- Ambiguous implementation: the partition model
- Implementation via backward induction
- Feasible Bayesian implementation with state dependent feasible sets
- Implementation of allocation rules under perfect information
- Efficiency and imperfect competition with incomplete markets.
- A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation
- Perfect Bayesian implementation
- A full characterization of Nash implementation with strategy space reduction
- Bayesian implementation with verifiable information
- Efficient trading mechanisms with pre-play communication
- Detail-free mechanism design in twice iterative dominance: Large economies
- Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types
- Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: a unified approach to exact and approximate implementation
- Robust and secure implementation: equivalence theorems
- Implementation under ambiguity
- The evolution of monetary equilibrium
- Implementation in differential information economies
- Mixed Bayesian implementation in general environments
- A dynamic non-direct implementation mechanism for interdependent value problems
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