Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms
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Publication:5753711
DOI10.2307/2298024zbMath0721.90007OpenAlexW2038230733MaRDI QIDQ5753711
Dilip Mookherjee, Stefan Reichelstein
Publication date: 1990
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2298024
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