Early refund bonuses increase successful crowdfunding

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2021.05.006zbMath1470.91110OpenAlexW3168854482MaRDI QIDQ2049467

Alex Tabarrok, Robertas Zubrickas, Timothy N. Cason

Publication date: 25 August 2021

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.05.006

zbMATH Keywords

experimentpublic goodsconditional cooperationfree ridingdonationslaboratoryassurance contractearly contributionsrefund bonuses

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Experimental work for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-05) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

Related Items (1)

Refund bonuses and revenue equivalence

Uses Software

• Z-Tree
• ORSEE

Cites Work

• Enhancing fundraising with refund bonuses
• Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Conditional cooperation: review and refinement
• Financing Public Goods by Means of Lotteries
• Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
• Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core through Private Contributions
• Time Horizon and Cooperation in Continuous Time
• Joint Projects without Commitment
• Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms
• Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment

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