Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core through Private Contributions
From MaRDI portal
Publication:4205221
DOI10.2307/2297502zbMATH Open0686.90012OpenAlexW1972855376MaRDI QIDQ4205221FDOQ4205221
Mark Bagnoli, Barton L. Lipman
Publication date: 1989
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/100743
Recommendations
- Contributing or free-riding? Voluntary participation in a public good economy
- Provision of public goods in a large economy
- Private provision of discrete public goods with incomplete information
- Private provision of a discrete public good: efficient equilibria in the private-information contribution game
- Voluntary contributions when the public good is not necessarily normal
efficiencyprivate provision of public goodscore allocationscomplete information economyfree-rider behaviourimplementing the corerefinements of Nash equilibriaundominated perfect equilibrium outcomes
Cited In (42)
- Perfect equilibria in games of incomplete information
- Private provision of discrete public goods with incomplete information
- Robustness to strategic uncertainty
- Reaching consensus through approval bargaining
- Community projects: an experimental analysis of a fair implementation process
- Implementing a public project and distributing its cost
- Private provision of discrete public goods
- An implementation-theoretic approach to non-cooperative foundations
- The possibility of efficient provision of a public good in voluntary participation games
- The existence of perfect equilibrium in discontinuous games
- Efficient private production of public goods under common agency
- Simple subscription mechanisms for excludable public goods
- The limit to behavioral inertia and the power of default in voluntary contribution games
- The pivotal mechanism versus the voluntary contribution mechanism: an experimental comparison
- Optimal mechanisms for siting noxious facilities
- Profit allocation in investment-based crowdfunding with investors of dynamic entry times
- Optimal crowdfunding design
- The conditional contribution mechanism for repeated public goods -- the general case
- Evolution of global contribution in multi-level threshold public goods games with insurance compensation
- The production and cost-sharing of an excludable public good
- Collective action: experimental evidence
- Public goods provision: Applying Jackson-Moulin mechanism for restricted agent characteristics
- The consequences of a refund in threshold public good games
- How well do people play a quantum prisoner's dilemma?
- Crowdfunding mechanism comparison when product quality is uncertain
- Early refund bonuses increase successful crowdfunding
- Identifiability of individual contributions in a threshold public goods experiment
- A solution to the hold-up problem involving gradual investment.
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Voluntary contributions when the public good is not necessarily normal
- Perfect equilibria in simultaneous-offers bargaining
- Overcoming the coordination problem: dynamic formation of networks
- Pledge-and-review bargaining
- Output restriction and the ratchet effect: evidence from a real-effort work task
- Noncooperative Dynamic Contribution to a Public Project
- Participatory funding coordination: model, axioms and rules
- Bidding for the surplus: realizing efficient outcomes in economic environments
- Matching and challenge gifts to charity: evidence from laboratory and natural field experiments
- Auctioning a discrete public good under incomplete information
- A simple market-like allocation mechanism for public goods
- Enhancing fundraising with refund bonuses
- Introduction to the special issue of Games and Economic Behavior in honor of John O. Ledyard
This page was built for publication: Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core through Private Contributions
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4205221)
