Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core through Private Contributions

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Publication:4205221

DOI10.2307/2297502zbMath0686.90012OpenAlexW1972855376MaRDI QIDQ4205221

Mark Bagnoli, Barton L. Lipman

Publication date: 1989

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/100743




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