Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core through Private Contributions

DOI10.2307/2297502zbMath0686.90012MaRDI QIDQ4205221

Barton L. Lipman, Mark Bagnoli

Publication date: 1989

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/100743

zbMATH Keywords

efficiency; core allocations; private provision of public goods; complete information economy; free-rider behaviour; implementing the core; refinements of Nash equilibria; undominated perfect equilibrium outcomes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A40: Other game-theoretic models

91B50: General equilibrium theory

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