The consequences of a refund in threshold public good games

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2015.05.032MaRDI QIDQ529802zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Anna Stepanova, Edward J. P. Cartwright

Publication date 9 June 2017

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/2086/16919

zbMATH Keywords

refundthresholdpublic goodmoney back guarantee

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental studies (91A90) Public goods (91B18)

Recommendations

• Enhancing fundraising with refund bonuses
• Efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game
• Step returns in threshold public goods: A meta- and experimental analysis
• Group size and collective action in a binary contribution game
• Early refund bonuses increase successful crowdfunding

Cites work

• Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core through Private Contributions
• Step returns in threshold public goods: A meta- and experimental analysis

Cited in

(6)

• Refund bonuses and revenue equivalence
• Stochastic dynamics and stable equilibrium of evolutionary optional public goods game in finite populations
• Efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game
• Goodwill can hurt: a theoretical and experimental investigation of return policies in auctions
• Enhancing fundraising with refund bonuses
• Sampled-data state feedback control design for evolutionary threshold public goods games on coupled networks

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

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