The consequences of a refund in threshold public good games

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2015.05.032zbMATH Open1364.91041OpenAlexW1958460807MaRDI QIDQ529802FDOQ529802

Authors: Anna Stepanova, Edward J. P. Cartwright 

Publication date: 9 June 2017

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2086/16919

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zbMATH Keywords

refundthresholdpublic goodmoney back guarantee

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental studies (91A90) Public goods (91B18)

Cites Work

• Step returns in threshold public goods: A meta- and experimental analysis
• Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core through Private Contributions

Cited In (6)

• Sampled-data state feedback control design for evolutionary threshold public goods games on coupled networks
• Efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game
• Goodwill can hurt: a theoretical and experimental investigation of return policies in auctions
• Stochastic dynamics and stable equilibrium of evolutionary optional public goods game in finite populations
• Refund bonuses and revenue equivalence
• Enhancing fundraising with refund bonuses

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

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