Group size and collective action in a binary contribution game
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Publication:2178582
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2020.02.003zbMATH Open1437.91205OpenAlexW3005390961MaRDI QIDQ2178582FDOQ2178582
Authors: Georg Nöldeke, Jorge Peña
Publication date: 11 May 2020
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/26531/1/wp_iast_1886.pdf
Recommendations
collective actionparticipation gamesprivate provision of public goodsgroup size effectsteamwork dilemmathreshold games
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Cited In (17)
- Group efforts when performance is determined by the ``best shot
- Is three a crowd? Small group provision of a public good
- Group size paradox and public goods
- On the size and structure of group cooperation
- On the probability of breakdown in participation games
- The consequences of a refund in threshold public good games
- Regime change games with an active defender
- When Does One Bad Apple Spoil the Barrel? An Evolutionary Analysis of Collective Action
- Size-dependent minimum-effort games and constrained interactions
- Contests with group size uncertainty: experimental evidence
- Punishing free-riders: How group size affects mutual monitoring and the provision of public goods
- One, Two, Many—Insensitivity to Group Size in Games with Concentrated Benefits and Dispersed Costs
- Steady-state stock and group size: an approach of dynamic voluntary provisions of public goods
- Cooperative dilemmas with binary actions and multiple players
- The relationship between group size and the private provision of public goods
- The shirker's dilemma and the prospect of cooperation in large groups
- Group size and free riding when private and public goods are gross substitutes
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