Group size and collective action in a binary contribution game

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2020.02.003MaRDI QIDQ2178582zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Georg Nöldeke, Jorge Peña

Publication date 11 May 2020

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/26531/1/wp_iast_1886.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

collective actionparticipation gamesprivate provision of public goodsgroup size effectsteamwork dilemmathreshold games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Public goods (91B18)

Recommendations

• The relationship between group size and the private provision of public goods
• Is three a crowd? Small group provision of a public good
• Group size paradox and public goods
• Group efforts when performance is determined by the ``best shot
• Private provision of discrete public goods

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1168312 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 765034 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 903638 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3367907 (Why is no real title available?)
• An evolutionary analysis of the volunteer's dilemma
• Binary participation and incremental provision of public goods
• Evolution and mixed strategies
• Gains from switching and evolutionary stability in multi-player matrix games
• Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
• Group size effects in social evolution
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• Population uncertainty and Poisson games
• Private provision of discrete public goods
• Robust rational turnout
• Stochastic ordering of classical discrete distributions
• Testing Statistical Hypotheses
• The Evolution of Conventions
• The evolution of \(n\)-player cooperation -- threshold games and ESS bifurcations
• When Does One Bad Apple Spoil the Barrel? An Evolutionary Analysis of Collective Action

Cited in

(17)

• Group size and free riding when private and public goods are gross substitutes
• Group size paradox and public goods
• Group efforts when performance is determined by the ``best shot
• The relationship between group size and the private provision of public goods
• Punishing free-riders: How group size affects mutual monitoring and the provision of public goods
• Size-dependent minimum-effort games and constrained interactions
• The shirker's dilemma and the prospect of cooperation in large groups
• The consequences of a refund in threshold public good games
• Contests with group size uncertainty: experimental evidence
• On the size and structure of group cooperation
• One, Two, Many—Insensitivity to Group Size in Games with Concentrated Benefits and Dispersed Costs
• Steady-state stock and group size: an approach of dynamic voluntary provisions of public goods
• On the probability of breakdown in participation games
• Is three a crowd? Small group provision of a public good
• When Does One Bad Apple Spoil the Barrel? An Evolutionary Analysis of Collective Action
• Cooperative dilemmas with binary actions and multiple players
• Regime change games with an active defender

This page was built for publication: Group size and collective action in a binary contribution game

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2178582)