Evolution and mixed strategies

DOI10.1006/game.2000.0813zbMath0994.91008OpenAlexW2023320309MaRDI QIDQ5931923

Kenneth G. Binmore, Larry Samuelson

Publication date: 28 September 2002

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2000.0813

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionarily stable strategiesasymmetric gamemixed strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (8)

Group size and collective action in a binary contribution game ⋮ The parental investment conflict in continuous time: St. Peter's fish as an example ⋮ An asymmetric parental investment conflict with continuous strategy sets ⋮ Evolution in Bayesian games. II: Stability of purified equilibria ⋮ Artificial distinction and real discrimination ⋮ Cycles versus equilibrium in evolutionary games ⋮ A GENERALIZED MODEL OF BEST RESPONSE ADAPTATION ⋮ Time-dependent animal conflicts. II: The asymmetric case

Cites Work

• Game theoretical foundations of evolutionary stability
• Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
• The Logic of Animal Conflict
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
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