An asymmetric parental investment conflict with continuous strategy sets

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2005.04.012zbMath1445.92218OpenAlexW2094253304WikidataQ81884451 ScholiaQ81884451MaRDI QIDQ2196870

Osnat Yaniv

Publication date: 3 September 2020

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2005.04.012

zbMATH Keywords

ESSparental investment conflictpayoff-irrelevant asymmetrypayoff-relevant asymmetry

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Applications of game theory (91A80) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (2)

Properties of a mixed ESS candidate in continuous strategy sets ⋮ Dynamical adaptation of parental care

Cites Work

• Time-dependent animal conflicts. I: The symmetric case
• The parental investment conflict in continuous time: St. Peter's fish as an example
• Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
• Evolutionarily stable strategies with two types of player
• Evolution and mixed strategies

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