Regime change games with an active defender

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2021.05.008MaRDI QIDQ2049469zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ole Jann, Christoph Schottmüller

Publication date 25 August 2021

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.05.008

zbMATH Keywords

coordinationglobal gamespanopticonregime change gamestransparency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

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Cites work

• A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements
• Defending against speculative attacks: the policy Maker's reputation
• Determining all Nash equilibria in a (bi-linear) inspection game
• Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
• Group size and collective action in a binary contribution game
• Group size effects in social evolution
• Information Manipulation, Coordination, and Regime Change*
• Inspection games in arms control
• Probability Inequalities for Sums of Bounded Random Variables
• Selection-free predictions in global games with endogenous information and multiple equilibria
• Sequential Information Design
• The volunteer's dilemma and the optimal size of a social group

Cited in

(3)

• A generalized approach to solve perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium for practical network attack and defense
• Optimal transparency of monitoring capability
• Private sunspots in games of coordinated attack

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