Optimal transparency of monitoring capability

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2023.105620zbMath1518.91124MaRDI QIDQ6163286

Teck Yong Tan

Publication date: 9 June 2023

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

inspection gameinformation designmonitoring capability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Cites Work

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• Grading exams: 100,99,98,\(\dots \) or \(A,B,C\)?
• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• Bayesian persuasion with costly messages
• Regime change games with an active defender
• Sweet lemons: mitigating collusion in organizations
• The Economics of Career Concerns, Part I: Comparing Information Structures
• Delegation of Monitoring in a Principal-Agent Relationship
• On Transparency in Organizations
• Arm's Length Relationships
• Optimal Monitoring Design
• Test Design Under Falsification

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