Optimal transparency of monitoring capability
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Publication:6163286
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2023.105620zbMath1518.91124MaRDI QIDQ6163286
Publication date: 9 June 2023
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Applications of game theory (91A80) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Principal-agent models (91B43)
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