Optimal Monitoring Design

DOI10.3982/ECTA16475MaRDI QIDQ4992162zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors George Georgiadis, Balázs Szentes

Publication date 7 June 2021

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta16475

zbMATH Keywords

monitoringmoral hazardprincipal-agent

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

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Cited in

(21)

• Earnings profile and monitoring under asymmetric information
• Optimal contracts with random monitoring
• Reservation wage and optimal contract for experts
• The perils of friendly oversight
• Optimum observing strategies
• Optimal monitoring of networks
• Monitoring experts
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3980186 (Why is no real title available?)
• Conditional Monitoring Policy Under Moral Hazard
• Optimal contract design for effort-averse sensors
• Optimal incentive contract with endogenous monitoring technology
• Optimal monitoring schedule in dynamic contracts
• Optimal Alarm Systems for Count Processes
• Slow persuasion
• Optimal transparency of monitoring capability
• Robust contracting under double moral hazard
• Experimentation and approval mechanisms
• Statistical uncertainty and coarse contracts
• Feedback design in dynamic moral hazard
• The dynamics of project standards
• Algorithmic contract theory: a survey

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