Optimal Monitoring Design

DOI10.3982/ECTA16475zbMath1466.91170OpenAlexW3088173592MaRDI QIDQ4992162

George Georgiadis, Balázs Szentes

Publication date: 7 June 2021

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta16475

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardmonitoringprincipal-agent

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Related Items (4)

The perils of friendly oversight ⋮ Slow persuasion ⋮ Optimal transparency of monitoring capability ⋮ Robust contracting under double moral hazard

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